The World Of Heidegger

Finitude as my Earthly Freedom

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The purpose of this discourse is the philosophical or the hermeneutical/ontological analysis of Martin Heidegger and specifically his book, *Being and Time*, in relation to metaphysics, phenomenology, existentialism, and semantics. The point is that Heidegger vehemently rejects metaphysics. My position is first and foremost a Heideggerian stand. One might even ask: why do I start my inquiry by introducing Karl Jaspers’s and Jose Ortega Y Gasset’s positions about the world-of-being-there, of truth, of the-other, of concern, of freedom, of things as things and that of human environment in general? My philosophical argument will be Heideggerian, in response to or as opposed to the philosophical inquires, especially of Edmund Husserl and Jean-Paul Sartre, of Emmanuel Levinas and Ernst Tugendhat. I would also add that, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is exceptional (at least for me) from the rest, because his phenomenology is not far apart from Heidegger’s existential-hermeneutical or phenomenological-hermeneutical order, or when we talk about our human world as we are involved-evolved-immersed in the environment of our presence. I will focus only in Merleau-Ponty’s last and unfinished book, *The Visible and the Invisible*, because in this particular book we can see the real-authentic position of Merleau-Ponty, as it pertains to Heidegger’s position in *Being and Time* relating to the milieu we operate in. In The
Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty stars with a striking position saying: “We see the things themselves, the world is what we see…” (3) He takes a very critical position against Sartre—this will land him in to a closer Heideggerian field disposing the notion of subject-object and vice versa—the unity of being takes place as that which we find the world to be—we are in it as one whole. We are it. We are the center of it.

Where Merleau-Ponty diverges from Heidegger, however, is that for him “being-there” is not a thrown projection; but rather, we are already there in the world of things and we find the world as it is. We are in-between. We find that even for Heidegger, however, we are in between things and among the-they. I will discuss the merging horizons of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty a bit latter. That being said, Heidegger’s hermeneutical path departs from existential and phenomenological bases, but his breach with all the previous claims is aimed at one thing: what is “being-there” in the world of things? It is aimed to overcome metaphysics and dualism. This manner of existence for Heidegger is embodied in the notion of [Dasein]. According to Heidegger’s prism/understanding of Dasein, we can say that, Dasein, i.e. “being-there” as that which is, is the world that we are in and in the environment we participate in our everydayness, along-side of the-they—we are it and in it, but as being inauthentic. Another way to put it, it is that, Dasein is finitude. Dasein comprehends the world because the worldhood of the world is Dasein. Dasein then, is the condition of the possibility of the world as such—if there is no such condition for Dasein to be/exist, there is no world as we know it in its worldhood.

To be sure, Heidegger is not flirting with Kant’s transcendentalism, because Heidegger’s path is profoundly existential and ‘centripetal’. That means that, Heidegger embraces the center radiation of being in the world of things and in their environment. The realm of object is that which the possibility of subject follows, but most importantly, Dasein comes even before subject. Another notion of Dasein is that, Dasein is a thrown projection and that is how Dasein understands the possibility of it-self to be, i.e. to be as an existential being in its enigmatic or obscure ‘care’—only Dasein can be real and essentially ‘meaningful’. It is meaningful because Dasein has a world that surrounds its existence. This is not an illusionary situation of Dasein’s meaningfulness, but rather, Dasein is hidden in-to/on-to the surfaces of things as things or of forms as forms or of life as life. The point that Heidegger is trying to make in Being and Time is that, Dasein is a meaningful thing and that it is to be seen by it-self—it is not a causal or judgmental act, nor a propositional moment either; but rather, Dasein is a “tautological” condition of being there in the world as ‘disclosure’. So then, what is it to be inauthentic and authentic? Heidegger goes back and forth with these notions, and implies that inauthentic is the ‘idle talk’ engaged in our everydayness. And the authentic true being
is to be found in Dasein’s disclosure towards death, which would mean ‘freedom’. Death is always mine and the other’s death cannot be related to my own. The moment of finitude individualizes me from the rest and thus throws me into my authentic existence in the world. So there is an anticipatory resoluteness that leads us towards death and that is the most authentic being of being free. Dasein for Heidegger is an ecstatic-temporality—it does not abide in the subject, but rather along-side things in their finitude.

**Heidegger’s Divergence from Metaphysics, Existentialism and Phenomenology**

They may be valid. But I was only given
One vision of the things that exist on earth,
And an uncertain mind,
And the knowledge that we die.

Fernando Pessoa, *Selected Poems*

**On Sartre: the “look” and being-in-the-midst-of the-world**

It is interesting to see how Husserl influenced and at the same time alienated Heidegger, and the same thing could be said for Merleau-Ponty in relation to Husserl; however, I will cast some light on both cases a bit latter. With Sartre we see that he remained under the shadow of Hegel’s dialectics or Cartesian dualism. Sartre became an ultra-Bolshevik-dialectician, or as Merleau-Ponty would say: the ultimate Cartesian. Sartre never gave it up and never even questioned his doctrinal position. However, my concern is not Sartre’s reincarnation of Marxist philosophical-cholera, nor Heidegger’s opportunist political traumas or dramas during Nazi Germany, but rather; I will discuss their philosophical engagements about “being-in-the-world” as it pertains in all aspects of our existence as existence, of freedom as freedom, of being as being and of truth as truth—neither ideologically, nor metaphysically nor theologically but solely ontologically
or hermeneutically. This was the main concern of Being and Time and this will be my main angle in this inquiry.

In Being and Nothingness Sartre takes an anti-Heideggerian stance, propelling and advocating a pure dialectical philosophy, claiming the positivism of being as transcendence-transcended, which means, to transcend other’s transcendence. To put in another way, I truly experience myself as a subject when I experience the other as an object and vice versa. The other has to emerge as a [fact]. That is why Sartre introduces the notion of opacity in our consciousness where the “ego” is not to be found on the subject but rather on the object. How does Sartre interpret and understand the notion of truth and freedom in the world? After all, the solo factor of Sartre in Being and Nothingness is the notion of freedom. Sartre states: “Being-seen-by-the-Other is the truth of seeing-the-Other... I see myself because somebody sees me...” (345, 349) The concept of reciprocity is significant for Sartre, because my truth and factual being is activated by the look of the other. I am becoming a look (here, the look is not an actual object per say, or better yet, the eye is the actual object in this case), that sees myself and in order for me to see myself, I need to distance and be the nothingness of myself. The great example of Sartre in this regard, is the case when ‘I have glued my ear to the door and look through a keyhole’. This is a situation of nothingness because I see and I am being seen. Here we have a three-way-perceptual engagement, i.e. I am the one that is not aware of my body in the act that I am looking at, but when I hear the sudden footsteps of another person, I become aware of myself as an object—I am objectified.

According to Sartre, this is a situation of reflective consciousness as opposed to the unreflective consciousness when at first I was looking at the other. What the other constitutes for me is the notion of space (for Sartre space is not grasped proximally and spatially as in Heidegger’s Dasein—‘being-there’ in the world, but presents itself as confronting the other’s factual look), where I am being looked at as an object and I look at the other as an object simultaneously—the factual presence of the other person completes me as an object. It is here that Sartre takes on the Hegelian mode of the other being perceived as a total/unified subject—I and the other exist as separate and yet, we function within the totality of the world. In other words, the world is the domain of my possible possibilities where the interference of the other is the limit of my possibilities. In Sartre’s view, the other is the death of my possible possibilities as I am also, the death of other’s possibilities in the world. While for Heidegger, death is always my finitude and because death individualizes me as I only, my death is not related to other’s death because in being my death, it brings me closer to my mode of authentic mode of existence—of my freedom.
It is the notion of “freedom”, as that which Sartre has in his mind from the beginning of *Being and Nothingness* until the end of it—I am situated in the midst of the world in the mode of fleeing it and yet, I am related to the other as not being the other, and that is for as long as I am free. My freedom is the very vital condition to be in the world with the others. There are two questions that arise here: how do I manifest myself and my subjectivity? Is it through “my body” and the factual “body of the other”? The preconditions that Sartre gives us in regards to the understanding of the body as “being-for-itself” and “being-for-others” as we relate in the midst of the world, it is such as that, these two realities of body-for-itself and body-for-the-others operate into two different realms of action. That means that these two Hegelian dialectical modes of being in the world cannot be abated or diminished as one unity—they have different purposes and functions. For Heidegger on the other hand, Dasein is one unity and this unity is not subject-object unity; but rather, it is a primordial unity and it even surpasses the relation of subject-object—in Dasein or being-there-in-the-world, there are no parts because the presence of Dasein as being there is given as one whole.

What is indubitable here, is the vindication of Sartre regarding the not at all infinitesimal notion that: “The body is nothing other than the for-itself...But it is the fact that the for-itself is not its own foundation, and this fact is expressed by the necessity of existing as an engaged, contingent being among other contingent beings”. (408) Sartre emphasizes the notion that my factual body needs another point of reference for it to be it, and this ecstatic fleeing being is not centered in a particular place, i.e. my existence is surpassed by my evasion negating myself. For Sartre, my-body-as-that-which-is-for-itself, is the factual object that constantly “encounters” others in the midst of the world—*look*. On the other hand, for Heidegger, Dasein is my-being-there-*in*-the-world and that constitutes my unitary aspect of existence as being-with and along-side in the mode of everydayness, of average condition of the-they-them. For Heidegger, to be in the world is not just to be present-at-hand as Sartre would say, because a mountain or a tree is present-at-hand and that Dasein is more than just that. Dasein is the world—us/we. Dasein is being-in-the-world as in dwelling in it or as mineness resides in it—the world is my familiar home with myself. If, for Sartre, I have to encounter the other as a fact/facticity or as a present-at-hand; for Heidegger however, Dasein understands itself as a thing in the worst possibilities of the world. If Dasein would exist as facticity, it would exist in some other manner and that would be an existential fact. This fact of Dasein exits hermeneutically only. My being is a temporal being-there as a moment of dispersal and Falling—that means “concern”. It is precisely here where Sartre finds himself in conflict with Heidegger. It is this notion of everydayness of the “they” that Sartre repudiates, because for him the “they” has no
particular look/gaze over my-body—it does not encounter me, but it constitutes me in reticence or in the realm of solipsism.

The last point that I want to make in regards to Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness*, is to re-emphasize again the aspect of *being in the world* understood as “being-for-itself” and “being-for-others”. For Sartre, there is an encounter or an engagement that takes place and this encounter with one another materializes through the prospect of “internal negation”; that of the “external relation” is a given need for the encounter to take place as direct and present-at-hand. Now the body-for-others is a necessary agency, and it is here where Sartre congeals his thought elucidating that: “the Other, appears to me as a transcendence-transcended. That is, by the mere fact that I project myself toward my possibilities...The Other’s body is therefore the Other himself as a transcendence-instrument”. (446-7) Sartre views the Other’s factual body as a pure presence-at-hand and as an instrument or mechanism through which I can bounce off and also, I can encapsulate myself/object or selfness transcending the selfness of the other. The other is my object/mirror as that which enables my objectification and selfness to materialize as a transcendence, fleeing towards my possible possibilities. In other words, the body of the other is the instrument through which I can transcend my selfness—the look is the most pertinent factor of this encounter. Because through the other’s look I can experience my objectification, however, this is something that I do not know and is absolutely unknown to me, i.e. as far as I am not engaged in the midst of the world. I apprehend myself-as-object because I am perpetually fleeing towards the other, who consequently makes me realize my being as responsible for other’s existence.

**On Husserl and Merleau-Ponty**

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger plays off with Husserl, and yet Husserl’s phenomenological “horizons” had an impact on Heidegger and that applies to Merleau-Ponty as well. The paradox though, is that Heidegger dedicated this book to Husserl with admiration and yet, he treated him with disregard or not as a primary factor of his philosophical inquiries. Heidegger mentioned Husserl just in the beginning and very little—almost non-existent. Then, why Heidegger from the beginning of *Being and Time*, wanted to demarcate or diverge from Husserl’s phenomenology of “transcendental reduction” or “eidetic abstraction”? And, why Merleau-Ponty gradually but clearly demarcated from Husserl’s “subjective absolutism”? One of the few points that I want
to make is that in relation to Husserl, both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty share more with one another than one might think of—more than Ernst Tugendhat as one of most respectful of Heidegger’s disciples (after Gadamer) shares with Heidegger. Now, I will cast some light on some aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology, or transcendental-reduction in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s hermeneutical stance. I will analyze them in one triangle because they share the notion of *phenomenological horizons* where our being evolves and engages in the world.

First and foremost, Husserl had a great allergic problem with the notion of “being-with-the-other (s)”. For Husserl the question is this: How in the world, can I go through other’s body to the pure nature of subjectivity? Merleau-Ponty says that we need the other, because for us the other opens up the gate of vision enabling us to penetrate into the world of things, but [not] the other as “facticity” as Sartre would say. For Heidegger, we need the “They” or the others because we are spatially and proximally in the world along-side of/with them-the-other (s). Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty emphasize the aspect that we are already there, in *between* things dwelling in space and in the world that we find ourselves to be. We are in-the-world. We are *It*. Husserl is deeply concerned with the horizons of perception where he believes that we have to arrive to the “essence” of a perceiving thing. In other words, Husserl stands on the platform of “transcendental reduction” which is “eidetic abstraction”. For him there is not just the experience that matters here—it is about the *essential structure* as a free variation. The question that comes up is this: how can one describe the essence of perception? Husserl would say that, one cannot perceive all sides of an object at once—but one at a time, one facet or profile at a time. In *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl tackles the notion of transcendental subjectivity, which is to say, he is contemplating the reduction of totality of what is real to the mode of transcendental and phenomenological reduction or eidetic abstraction; reformulating a pure reductive-subjective state or condition of being-in-the-world. This path will lead him to the essence of the ‘thing’, i.e. our way of seeing the world of things—with no exteriority taking place whatsoever. In this way, for Husserl phenomenology is the field of essences or the domain of cognitive science that searches the state of essences and how they are constituted subjectively.

Husserl asserts that: “First, the Cartesian *cogitatio* already requires the phenomenological reduction. The psychological phenomenon in psychological apperception and objectification is not a truly absolute datum. The truly absolute datum is the *pure phenomenon*, that which is reduced. The mentally active ego, the object, man in time, the thing among things, etc., are not absolute data; hence man’s mental activity as his activity is no absolute datum either...But one thing seems to help along: *eidetic abstraction*. It yields inspectable universal, species, essences, and so it seems to
provide the redeeming idea: for we do not seek “seeing” clarity about the essence of cognition”? (5, 6) Husserl is explicitly implying that the original/authentic way to arrive at the pure essence of things, or objects, is through pure seeing—what fills out the hole/void of empiricism, sciences, Kantian intellectualism and epistemology, and Cartesian dualism is the notion of *eidetic abstraction* (the phenomenal *bracketing out*), as that which operates not on the basis of the objective world, the world of the things where man’s objective and mental activity happens; but rather, in a ‘pure inner subjectivity’ or in a pure absolute abstraction, where we reduce the whole of reality to a phenomenal reduced datum. In other words, the world we perceive is not possible to be conceptualized, unless it is constituted by the notion of transcendental ego, i.e. there is no option for anything to be it, if it is not to rely for its existence on the phenomenal-self. Neither Heidegger nor Merleau-Ponty is in agreement with Husserl’s *eidetic abstraction*, because the fact is that for Husserl, the transcendental reduction is an *eidetic abstraction* or reduced to a “zero-index”. Husserl’s claim is that there is a free mode of variation in regards to the aspect of perceptual horizon, i.e. essence in itself is that which dictates various possibilities.

Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of Husserl’s phenomenology is primarily related to the Other’s notion of-the-world-of-things. Merleau-Ponty’s view is that, the world is a compound of things that refer to other compounds or staff or things [*Sachen*]—the world hangs as one unity or as a referential compound. Merleau-Ponty would coin it as “the flesh of the world”. Heidegger’s refutation of Husserl’s phenomenology comes about as a result of Heidegger’s belief that “The-They” [*Das Man*] is that *horizon* where we exist as Dasein or as being-there in the world, along-side others/things. Therefore, the notion of the world [*Umwelt*] in Heidegger’s terms and understanding is that, we better do not engage with the world propositionally/naturalistically, i.e. viewing the world like a nexus or ligament—if we do see it in that way, than we do nothing else but see the world as “present-at-hand”. Natural sciences and metaphysics do this very well—the world for Heidegger is tautological and is proximally perceived and it answers itself, i.e. the world is the world of everydayness, and of an average condition of human experience. Heidegger in *Being and Time* states: “The Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited phenomenologically if we take as our clue our everyday Being-in-the-world, which we also call our “dealings” in the world and with entities within-the-world.” (95) The significance of this is that; 1) we are in-the-world, because we dwell in its space and we are it, in between things as Heidegger would coin the “equipment” that we deal with; 2) is that Dasein finds itself into such a condition in the world of entities engaged with them concernfully —the facticity is that everyday Dasein is there along-side entities. Things that are *ready-to-hand* are ontologically prior, i.e. the world surrounds me or it is everywhere around my presence, so that
unconditionally I “care” about it because, I am it and because I cannot separate myself from the world I am in.

What this means, is that the world is an open environment in front of me—openness. Dasein is a worldly openness inside of its outside, because Dasein is a priori and because Dasein always is already there announced in to the world of things as things and of being-there as being-there. It is the openness of my milieu that I find myself in, providing me with the equipment of my daily ready-to-hand Things—Dasein in this respect, is an everydayness which understands the condition of a possibility for me in relation to the world—it. All things as things and all entities as entities are destined for me, for Dasein—the world is “there” for me. Dasein understands the world in which finds itself to be in, because the “worldhood” of the world is Dasein itself, i.e. Dasein is the very condition of the possibility of the world as such, because this is the condition for Dasein to be-there-in-the-world-of-things: Dasein is the world.

Returning back to Merleau-Ponty, I would say that his connection or similarity to Heidegger, is not to be found in Heidegger’s Dasein as finitude; but rather, in the understanding of the word as such, and of the world as such of how we are engaged in, of the world that we find ourselves in between and already there among others and of the-they. In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty leaves behind the notion of subject-object relation and unifies his thought as one unity—he surpasses the dichotomy object vs. subject and vice versa, and enters into the compound that Heidegger is already in, i.e. we should not interpret the world based on the relation of object-subject matter but see the world as one unity. Merleau-Ponty states: “WE SEE THE THINGS THEMSELVES, the world is what we see...” (4) A bit further, Merleau-Ponty goes deeper into the very core of being-in the word saying/asking: “What if I took not only my views of myself into account but also the other’s views of himself and of me? Already my body as a stage director of my perception has shattered the illusion of a coinciding of my perception with the things themselves...No doubt, it is not entirely my body that perceives: I know that it can only prevent me from perceiving, that I cannot perceive without its permission; the moment perception comes my body effaces itself before it and never does the perception grasp the body in the act of perceiving.” (8, 9) Here, we are not even dealing anymore with the subjectivity of my body or the subjectivity of other’s body in the world, because as Merleau-Ponty pin points, it is the very conducting instances of my body as being-there the solo maestro directing the movements and the sounds of perception, leading my being-there to be in between the enigmatic or phantasmagorical world. To me, this sounds so much of Heideggerianism, because the fact is that for Heidegger, Dasein is a thrown projection and it is
existentially thrown in to the world—Dasein is a riddle, an enigma, and an obscure “care” of an ecstatic-temporal stretch.

Furthermore, according to Merleau-Ponty; I never reply to the lived experience of the other and that is so because my lived experience is my private world that exists for me only—so it is for the others. He says: “...each of us has a private world: these private worlds are “worlds” only for their titulars; they are not the world. The sole world, that is, the unique world, would be koivos kosmos, and our perceptions do not open upon it.” (10) It is this “public world” that is important here, as that which we evolve and exists; however, it is not my own world because my own world stands apart from the public world and that is so uniquely mine—my world is that which in Heidegger’s understanding is the authentic reticence or silence, and it relates to my existence and the manner I observe things in the world as things. In other words, it is precisely this open ground of our sharing the common world that I relate to Heidegger’s the-they everydayness, where Dasein is in the mode of everyday idle talk, ambiguity, and curiosity: this is the inauthentic existence of being-there. Inauthenticity is dispersed in the common world or the public world in the mask of the crowd or in the anonymity of the They. Dasein is the crowd. Dasein is that which belongs to the other before belongs to itself. If we had to ask who Dasein is, the Heideggerian answer would be: Dasein is in the mode of everydayness or as Merleau-Ponty would have put it—being-there in the public world where Dasein is the others.

Who then are the others? Everyone is the other (s), and that leads us to say that Dasein is nobody—no one in particular, i.e. I am ecstatically there as is Dasein with others because Dasein is the other (s); however, I am what they are and I think what they [Das Man] think. In this regard, Heidegger states: “As being-in-the-world, Dasein has already discovered a ‘world’ at any time...We have now shown that circumspective Being-in-the-world is spatial. And because Dasein is spatial in the way of de-severance and directionality can what is ready-to-hand within-the-world be encountered in its spatiality.” (145) The point that needs to be made is this: Dasein is that which brings Things close to us—Dasein is that moment and worldly condition that frees a spatial world—the worldly space shows itself as a priority, because space pre-supposes an already space and that space in Heidegger’s view is the world itself. In other words, our relationship to space is estimation and an approximate condition. We live in a world-space that is a “geo-existential-centric” environment and not a “helio-centric space”—the world we are in and that which we make as the one we see, is the world that has a “meaning” for us, because we are it—the world is earthly. When Heidegger talks about de-severance, we have to understand it as that which (Dasein) brings things close, because the estimation of the true world is not an exact measurement, but rather is our
being-there that dwells along-side it. In Heidegger’s understanding space is loose as that thing that is around and abound. De-severance is to bring things into the near sight of our being—it is a closeness that is a directional relationship as a seeing for, or that which brings things close, i.e. this is de-worlding, where distance is collapsed in front of our presence. Now, I will engage with Heidegger a bit closely and especially I will take a closer look in his Being and Time, where he makes one of the greatest contributions: Dasein is death and my death is mine only.


Levinas’ human suffering and Tugendhat’s propositional consciousness and linguistic semantics

After having shed some light on Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, now I will focus primarily on Heidegger’s Being and Time, with some sporadic comments on Levinas and Tugendhat. My main focus will be Dasein’s ecstatic-temporality as “care” and its “enigma” in the world of things as things. Thus, Dasein’s temporality and its outcome or rapture as the resoluteness of Dasein, leading us to say Dasein’s most authentic anticipation—finitude.

Now Levinas bounces-off with Heidegger and takes a critical position against him on many different fronts/grounds, however, the one that I find to be relevant in this inquiry is that of death. The issue for Levinas is the-other and how I evolve/involve my being in the “there-is” [il y a]. It is precisely this notion that attracts Levinas’ attention about death and where he nuances it with political, moral, ethical, anthropological and above all, theistic layers. Heidegger’s notion of death has to be understood primarily ontologically. Levinas’ search of/for the other goes beyond earthly other (s), and moves
to a profound metaphysical realm, i.e. God is introduced as that other and comes out-of-the-blue as an “absolute subjectivity”, reminding us of Husserl’s “eidetic abstraction” or Spinoza’s “pantheistic absolute being” or Hegel’s “absolute being as infinity.” Before analyzing the notion of death from Heidegger’s prism, let’s see how Levinas interprets and articulates the aspect of finitude. It is since his early writings that Levinas follows the same path in regards to death, starting with Time and the Other; 1947, to Totality and Infinity, 1961. In the earlier book Levinas states: “…in relation to the celebrated Heideggerian analyses of being toward death. Being toward death, in Heidegger’s authentic existence, is a supreme lucidity and hence a supreme virility. It is Dasein’s assumption of the uttermost possibility, and consequently makes possible the very feat of grasping a possibility—that is, it makes possible activity and freedom. Death in Heidegger is an event of freedom, whereas for me the subject seems to reach the limit of the possible in suffering.” (70) Along with this, let’s see how Levinas describes the same notion of death as suffering in Totality and Infinity saying: “The supreme ordeal of freedom is not death, but suffering…The supreme ordeal of will is not death, but suffering” (239) The question that comes up is; what “suffering” means for Levinas? Is it individual or is it collective? It seems to me that, politicizing in a moral/ethical fashion the notion of suffering aspect of death as caused or provoked by the other (s), Levinas is taking a highly ideological and political-anthropological claim where the role of what is justice or injustice is propelled and aimed at.

We can clearly anticipate that, Levinas believes that death is never present-at-hand; death is never my freedom, and that it is a future at a distance from my being in the world or my everyday communication, orientation, and worldly concerns. But for Heidegger, death is always present, it is always there; although never my death for as long as is the death of the-they—death for Heidegger “individualizes” me from the others, because death is mine, i.e. it is my most authentic condition. In other worlds, for Levinas ‘death is never now’ because, when death arrives I do no longer exist there. According to Levinas, we never experience death in its full force because the sufferings of death triumphs it. He does not support the idea of individualized death, or heroic death but indirectly and theistically aims at the notion that the Heideggerian death is too forceful or potent, i.e. when finitude takes place we are no longer in control of it, because we cannot experience it as experience. Levinas does not define death as that which is the arriving future, but rather, as that future of finitude that is revolving towards us causing us to suffer from this unpredictable condition.

Levinas introduces the notion of hatred and violence in relation to death. Here the political and moral nuances of death take place—collective consciousness is important because injustice takes place under these desires. We feel always threatened by the
other (s) that can make us suffer. Freedom for Levinas is not the Heideggerian finitude, but rather, that consciousness resisting the wave of human violence, thus enabling time to predict the outcome. This is why he claims: “death threatens me from beyond”. (234) The split between Heidegger and Levinas is that for Levinas death is [interpersonal] and for Heidegger solely [individual or even heroic] as my death that offers me the possibility of freedom and authenticity. To be sure, Levinas believes that ‘we are the same and the other’ and that is according to Levinas ‘the absolutely other is the other’. Levinas stance is an anti-ontological position favoring the realm of theistic-metaphysical order. Levinas is diametrically opposed to Heidegger in many fronts, but to summarize it we can say that, Levinas moves against the hermeneutical/ontological order viewing hermeneutics/ontology as hegemonic and inhumane in relation to human reality, but also for him, not only metaphysics precedes ontology, but it is ‘that’ drive of human desire to find the face-to-face absolute other—God. Here Levinas is much closer to the I and Thou of Martin Buber. That being said, I will not engage with the “theistic-mystic” position of Buber because this is not the purpose of my discourse. However, in my opinion Levinas has deeply penetrated in Buber’s zone of I-They transcending God.

Where does Tugendhat stand here? He is one of the most and the last original of Heideggerian disciples; however, in my opinion he is also, the one that diverges from him the most, i.e. if Gadamer embodied a deeper hermeneutical order and analysis of Heidegger’s hermeneutics; Tugendhat on the other hand, epitomizes Heideggerianism in the realm of “analytical” philosophy. Another way to put it is that, for Gadamer hermeneutic philosophy is not a means for philosophical ends, but rather is that which we are confronted or concurred with the-other (s). If we think of Heidegger at this point, we could say that for Heidegger, hermeneutic philosophy is a means for a phenomenal-ontological-existential end—to be able to understand our world and being-there-in-the-world-of-things or of beings as beings disclosed or unconcealed, authentic or inauthentic; that is to say, comprehend our worldly historicity as well. I will not go further with Gadamer in this regard, because my main focus is the position of Tugendhat. First and foremost, I will talk about Tugendhat in companionship with Santiago Zabala’s book, The Hermeneutic Nature of Analytic Philosophy. Zabala encapsulates the core issues of Tugendhat saying: “The semantic program Tugendhat proposes turns out to be a development of phenomenological and hermeneutical understanding; in other worlds, it always refers to Husserl and Heidegger, who are at the heart of his linguistic turn”. (6) Just a bit further, Zabala states: “The primary unit of comprehension is not the object but the sentence. Human understanding is neither a transcendental consciousness nor an overwordly Analytic philosophy and hermeneutics, according to Tugendhat, share the same program, since both consider language relative and limited, excluding the possibility of a metalanguage consciousness but a linguistic,
empirical, existential community.” (7-8) Therefore, according to Zabala’s interpretation of Tugendhat, we see that there are at least two significant points: 1) there are no given actual facts in our being-in-the-world; but rather, propositional truisms where the notion of consciousness is understood as propositional as well; 2) Tugendhat’s program or aim is to establish the field of self-understanding and consciousness through the path of semantic-linguistic principles, and finally to blur and fuse ontology in the domain of semantics, ending once and for all the idealistic subjectivism or metaphysics or any neo-Platonisms.

Now this is been a point that Heidegger aimed from the beginning of Being and Time: to dispel/abandon any metaphysical structure of Dasein. So than, where do Heidegger and Tugendhat diverge? This is a bit delicate because, Tugendhat sounds and starts to ask very much like a good Heideggerian and then, ends his answers in a semantic and analytic fashion, dreaming to unify Heidegger and Wittgenstein—here starts the demarcation. Another fundamental stage that Tugendhat performs is as Zabala asserts: “Tugendhat insists on the idea that philosophy supplies description but no definitions.” (17) And a few pages latter, Zabala makes another point saying that: “Tugendhat bases his entire analysis...of Heidegger’s philosophy on a tight grasp of the specific Husserlian sense of truth...because the specific sense of truth of “identifying” (or, in Heideggerian terms, “uncovering”) an entity precisely as it is itself.” (27) The commitment of Tugendhat to Heidegger and Husserl is obvious, but the manner or the usage of Heidegger’s hermeneutics and Husserl’s phenomenology is quite different—the difference relies in the ‘outcome’ of Tugendhat’s analytical and semantic strategy. Accordingly, Tugendhat takes such a stand that he rejects Heidegger’s notion of “truth”, as that which is to be found in concealment; because, in doing so, Heidegger correlates the notion of “truth” to the attentive understanding of disclosure as concern. Tugendhat distrusts or deeply questions Heidegger’s notion of truth as that which lies in uncoveredness or disclosure, because as Zabala asserts, the question that Tugendhat makes is this: “what does uncovering mean when it no longer signifies a point out in general? How is aletheuein to be differentiated from apophainesdai”? (35) In other words, how is to be understood the aspect of truth from that of phenomenological-existence? The rift between Tugendhat and Heideggerianism takes place precisely around the aspect and the reality of truth. Tugendhat’s approach is that of semantic-analytic-ontology, or as Zabala coins it, Tugendhat’s project is the “semantization” and “nominalization” of Heidegger’s being-there-in-the-world through language or more precisely, through linguistic analysis. That being said, Tugendhat’s refutation of Heidegger’s notion of “truth” is that, if we say that “truth” lies in concealment, than, what happens in regards to the “horizons” where the Heideggerian truth relies? Where is “being” justified in the ecstatic-temporality reaffirming itself into and onto the
horizons of the world as such? Now I will answer all the above questions from a Heideggerian point of view. But also, I will confirm and interpret my own Heideggerian thoughts or believes/understanding of Dasein.

**Ascending and Descending the Enigmatic-Heroic Heideggerian Mountain of “Dasein”**

I will recapture some statements that I have already made on my first two or three pages introduction of Heidegger. I think that, the biggest mistake one can make is to picture *Dasein* like those Russian *matroshka dolls*, where there is “in” it another one and another one and so on, like in box. And thus, seeing the world of Dasein as things among things exterior to Dasein—Dasein is the world itself. From a Heideggerian position, one can also say that, Dasein is not a corporeal/somatic thing; but rather, Dasein is a world that is far beyond itself. Another great interpretation of Dasein is that of the Philosopher and Professor Simon Critchley, where in his 2009 (*The New School For Social Research University, in New York*) lectures on Heidegger would say that; *Dasein is not as if it is the water “in” the glass.* I would have not agreed more with this understanding of being-in-the-world. Dasein is not like the water in the glass, precisely because that would be simply wrong and categorical and that is not what Heidegger intended. Dasein in Heidegger’s perspective is purely existential and because Dasein is “in” the world, i.e. Dasein is that existence that dwells in it and is the world itself.

At this point of our discourse we have come along enough, as to ask this: what does it mean that Dasein is “in” the world? What is that “being-in” or “being-there-in-the-world” means? The answer is to be found precisely in paragraph 12 of *Being and Time*, where Heidegger emphasizes the notion of “who” is *in* the world. He asserts: “Being-in...is a state of Dasein’s Being; it is an existential. So one cannot think of it as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) ‘in’ an entity which is present-at-hand...The entity to which Being-in in this signification belongs is one which we have characterized as that entity which in case I myself am [bin]. The expression ‘bin’ is connect with ‘bei’, and so *ich bin* ['I am] means in its turn “I reside” or “dwell” alongside” the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. “Being” [Sein], as the infinitive of *ich bin* (that is to say, when it is understood as an *existentielle*), signifies “to reside” alongside...”, “to be familiar with...”. “Being-in” *is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state.*” (79-80) With this long citation of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, I wanted to capture the sense and the sound of his understanding of what is Being-in,
what it means, and how it surrounds us in our everydayness. In other words, Being-in is dwelling in that space that Dasein is-in. Dasein is a unitary aspect or a phenomenon that exists in the world, and after all Dasein is mineness in the environment of average and of the-they. The world I reside-in is my familiar world that I find myself to be-in already there, or as Merleau-Ponty would say; the world is already given to me, it is already there and I am in “between” beginnings and ends—Jasper would say the same thing in regards to being in “between” beginnings and ends.

The world of my being is alongside others and that does not imply to be “present-at-hand”, because Dasein is in the world (as humans are in the world) only. A mountain or a tree is not in the world as same as is in-each-case-mineness [Jemeinigkeit], or as that which is always my being in the world—Dasein is my situation, i.e. my existence. Then, what is present-at-hand”? To be sure not mineness, but rather present-at-hand is any object that is given to me as already-there-in-the-world-of-things, e.g. a stone, a mountain, a tree, etc. One has to keep in mind that, Heidegger’s understanding of the world is that, a world where there is no human environment is a null world, i.e. it is not a world because we create the world as such as we humanly know it. The human world is earthly and finite.

The issue is that Dasein is not a Thing and if Dasein is to be a Thing, it can only be as such, in the manner where Dasein comprehends itself as a Thing in its most inferior or lowest possible world—factually would mean as Sartre would say, regarding the other as a factual presence and as that which I can mirror and acknowledge my existence—my existence through other’s object-presence is where I can realize my own subjectivity; in other words, through the other I transcend my being. Heidegger is vehemently opposed to this sort of being in the world, and for Heidegger, being factually in the world is to be dispersed or dissipated temporarily and that is Dasein’s Falling—to exist for Heidegger, is to exist as a human being and that means to be in the world—that would be Dasein’s concern. This is a phenomenally understood concern and not a sort odd ‘property’ concernful being-in-the-world. Concern is that familiar/habitual being in the world occupied with the worldly events concernfully, i.e. Dasein is never a Thing and never an entity, because it is always inside of the world and always free—Dasein does not depend on the relationship of subject vs. object and vice versa, or he would say, “...subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the world.” (87) Heidegger’s point is that we are inside dwelling in the world and we are it as well—we know the world because we define it as such—the world. If we are related to subject-object relationship of pseudo-epistemological issues, I think, we are really missing the point, because we are occupied too much with the above issues that we become invisible in the world.
What is important here is that, for Heidegger, Dasein does not need to transcend anything because Dasein is transcendence, i.e. Dasein is already out-there-in-the-world beyond things—Dasein is ecstatic and is always ahead of itself in the future. To be sure, Dasein is fascinated with the world. Perceptually, being in the world is a fascination by the things that we encounter and the way they reveal themselves to us just as they are—things. Heidegger says: “Proximally, this Being-already-alongside is not just a fixed staring at something that is purely present-at-hand. Being-in-the-world, as concern, is fascinated by the world with which is concerned.” (88) Perception is viewed as an act that encounters things as they are, leading as to the point to say that, Dasein is open to the world and that is openness inside of its outside world of things. That is precisely the case, because Dasein is a priori, always announced—it proclaims itself into the world—I am the world, i.e. I am my world and there is my being that makes the world as such. The reason for this is because Dasein in an “openness”, already out-side into the world of things and of the-they, it is also “ecstatic” and “beforehand”.

In paragraph 14 to 18 Heidegger emphasizes the aspect and the significance of what he terms, “worldhood”; meaning the importance of being in the world. It is the notion of “worldhood” or “worldliness” that enables and makes possible the average being of Dasein or Dasein’s daily existence in the “world”. This “world” for Heidegger is precisely the environment [Umwelt] that our world is comprehended as such. In other words, this is an existential condition of being-there-in-the-world, i.e. for Heidegger Dasein is a world that is constituted. However, it would be wrong to think that at this point Heidegger has penetrated into Kantian transcendentalism or idealism, (although he is flirting with it and analyzing it) because Heidegger’s understanding and concern is with the environment, but also, the world that we use things that are present-at-hand and already-there—the equipment. Before going any further, Heidegger makes a revealing point saying: “Worldhood is an ontological concept, and stands for the structure of one of the constitutive items of Being-in-the-world...Thus worldhood itself is an existentiale.” (92) That means that, if there is no presence of Dasein there is no world, that is to say, Dasein is the ultimate condition of the possibility of the world as such—Dasein understands the world, because the “worldhood” of the world is Dasein. The importance is that the very fact there is a world, means that there is Dasein, that is to say, even when the world breaks apart. The world is a unity or a totality—the world is ONE but adjoined or interconnected. Heidegger rises a question asking: “The presence-at-hand of entities is thrust to the fore by the possible breaks in that referential totality in which circumspection ‘operates’; how are we to get a closer understanding of this totality”? (107) Heidegger’s main concern is that the world is one unity, although this totality is revealed to us and we become aware when the world breaks down—the breakdown of ready-to-hand, i.e. the world is a unity as one, but we understand it as
such when we deal with the staff of the world, the staff and things that surround us and that staff that we encounter in our everydayness—alongside of the-they.

The main point that Heidegger wants to make is that, the world we live in is a whole of interconnected staff or things, where each thing is connected to the other—things refer to one another because the world announces itself as one totality. Another question is that “what-for” [Wo-Zu] the world is announced to us? Heidegger states: “…Dasein has assigned itself to an “in-order-to” [Um-zu], and it has done so in terms of a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is—...either authentic or inauthentic.” (119) It is in paragraph 18, that Heidegger redefines and clarifies the notion of “worldhood”. In doing that, he emphasizes and pin points the aspect of “for-the-sake-of-which” Dasein announced itself. The truth is that everything is defined by “what-for”; however, the end result of this “what-for” is nothing else but Dasein itself—for the sake-of-Dasein or better say, “for-the-sake-of-human-beings”. Because this is so, for as long as we understand that Dasein is “a priori” factor of the possibility we call “world”, i.e. the world of the world is Dasein, because Dasein-is-being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s position is against of the realistic-understanding of the world. Realism claims that the world is what it is, and that the world is independent from what there is. Heidegger on the other hand, supports the idea that, the world as we know it, it would not exist without Dasein (Humans), and here we are talking about the world of value, meaning, and of life and death as such. Heidegger’s understanding of life-world is a geo-existential-centric or an earthly-centripetal position, which means that there is evolved a human experience and which in itself has a meaning and a value in general. It is not about things as present-at-hand, but rather about us—the human world. This is Heidegger’s true disclosedness of earthly-life where death becomes meaningful and has its own value, i.e. this is the time of my authenticity and of my individual freedom.

Heidegger talks about the “region”, “place” and “closeness” that Dasein is involved. He claims: “Being-in-the-world is spatial.” (145) What does is mean that Dasein is situated in a loose space and that space is that around-abound openness? The matter is that Dasein operates in a space that brings things nearer. In Heidegger’s time that would be the Radio and the Telephone, when we hear others talking or communicating from a far distance; and yet, we feel that the others are near us, with us, talking to us and we hear their breath and voice as if they are in the same room with us. In our time, that would be the Internet/Computers, Skype, Facebook, Twitter, Television, iPhone, iPod, or any Satellite communication system. This is what Heidegger terms “de-severance”. He says: “...Dasein is essentially de-severance—that is, it is spatial.” (143) This is the ultimate collapsing of distance, of a distance that Dasein brings things “close”—it is a “directional” relationship where the directionality of Dasein is engaged in
de-severance. To put in another way, is that engagement brings things closest to us and our “sight”. What remains valid is that Dasein brings space close/closeness with direction that is also, an existential spatiality. It is a spatial estimation where the true world is not an exact measurement, but rather alongside. Dasein frees a spatial world. Space is the world that presupposes an already space. The world exists because it really means something to us.

Thus it is in paragraph 25 that Heidegger raises the question of the “who”. He states: “It could be that the “who” of everyday Dasein just is not the “I myself”. (150) Who then is who and who is “The-They” [Das Man] for Heidegger? Who is Dasein? We know that Dasein is being in the world. The implication here is that Dasein is Being-with [Mitsein]. The point is that for Heidegger, Dasein is not a thing; however, I am engaged in relationships with-others or other Dasein. Therefore, I do not exist as that which I can be myself—I am another or anyone. It is the everyday environment that I always experience a sort of condition/relation-among-others. The Being-with has a communal dimension because I am with others, and I do belong in the same world where the others belong as well, i.e. I am with the world [Mitwelt] sharing the same space and milieu together. It is our communal environment. This leads us to say that, Dasein is the condition of my everydayness, and that is my inauthentic-self. Heidegger sheds some light on this issue saying: “Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The “they”, which supplies the answer to the question of the “who” of everyday Dasein, is the “nobody”…” (165-6) Furthermore, Heidegger explicitly answers: “The “they” is an existentiale…” (167) This comment puts forward the idea that, the inauthentic-self, which is nobody in particular is prior to the authentic condition of self. Our community is prior to our individual self, because inauthenticity is dissipated in the façade of the crowd—of “the-they”.

Therefore, there is the notion of “anxiety” or “angst” that enables my authentic-being. It is the feeling of anxiety as that which individualizes me. Heidegger would say: “Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world...In anxiety one feels ‘uncanny’”. (232-3) Anxiety opens up my own possibilities and projects itself upon these disclosed possibilities of the future being. Dasein is time and time is finitude. Finitude singles me out as me—it is mineness. Dasein is a heroic-enigma and as such is a thrown projection. Anxiety is Death and thus it reveals to me my own authenticity, which is realized in my individualization through finitude and silence. It is in the mode of anxiety that I am anxious of fear and self. The mode of being inauthentic is the mode of being-with-the-they and chatting with others. Before I go any further, I will step back in retrospect for a bit, in regards to the aspect of “Disclosed” mode of Dasein, which for Heidegger is the “truth” of being (chapter V).
It is precisely in paragraph 28 that Heidegger defines the mode or the condition of Dasein and for him: “Dasein is its disclosedness.” (171) What is the importance of disclosed Dasein in the world? The importance lies in the fact that in “Chapter V” Heidegger introduces 4 key concepts of existence: 1) state of mind, 2) understanding, 3) discourse, and all of three are concerned-related to the disclosure of Dasein in which we are thrown in the world. The other point (the 4th) is that of “falling”, where is covered up through the nuances of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. In principle, it is in the domain of falling where language is important, because language is the house where every day being in the world is covered up—as facticity and activity. Heidegger’s claim is that: “Existentially, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matter to us. Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘bare mood’”. (177) Therefore, the condition of “Mood” is the point of departure, and that is so because Dasein is always in a mood/tune/attunement, and that is a condition of being-in-the-world. But also, there is Dasein’s intentionality disclosed in a condition/mood and that is because, it is directed toward something projecting somewhere. Thus, “a state-of-mind” is a mood that ought to reveal the reality and the truth of the world, i.e. thrown—a state-of-mind unravels Dasein in its thrown-ness, evading itself because Dasein is existentiale.

According to Heidegger, it is precisely this condition that Dasein is “there” in the world. Dasein understands the world and “…As understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities.” (188) The essence is that Dasein understands its ability to be, to be as a projection and a possibility. First and foremost, Dasein is first thrown, and then is to be thrown its project, i.e. projection is a sort of freedom in the world—it is a possibility. In other words, as an existentiale, Dasein is a thrown projection and an enigma. What matters here is the aspect of discourse or language as Heidegger states; “The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk.” (203) This means that, if there is no language there is not Dasein either, because language communicates the world. Talk is the entire situation or that condition that the possibilities of Dasein reveal themselves. Talk enables our sight to see and to see things through the path of general being of horizons’ discourse. In other words, is that through discourse or talk we articulate the environment; also, there is the condition of possible disclosedness. Heidegger’s truth of being in the world—is not the same as the manner that Tugendhat understands the truth, as that which it could be an empirical or analytic-semantic language. For Heidegger, Dasein is care and care becomes temporal, thus an anticipatory resoluteness that finds its freedom in finitude—this happens when Dasein is disclosed and emerged from the everydayness of the-They.
Falling is an important part of Dasein. It is absolutely wrong/false if falling is understood as one that falls from a bridge, a bicycle or a building; the falling of Dasein that Heidegger wants to communicate is an “existential-ontological” condition in the world of our “everydayness”. Falling is not to be seen as something negative. What is falling then? It is Dasein that is falling towards the world. The condition is that [ ontically ] , I am I and that is how I start with myself as I, but then in my everydayness I become “the-they-them” ontologically, lost in their obscure and enigmatic condition of nobody and this is everydayness—I become my enigma of mineness. In this regard, jumping a bit ahead of Being and Time, Heidegger makes a claim saying: “In everydayness Dasein can undergo dull ‘suffering’, sink away in the dullness of it, and evade it by seeking new ways in which its dispersion in its affairs may be further dispersed.” (422) We see that Dasein in an enigma and at the same time covers up other enigmatic conditions of “being-there”. It is this falling in the average dense/callous or dull situations that we find ourselves deep in and dissipated in the world, it is that moment of falling towards a place in a grim world-space. That seems to be the mood of Dasein—thrownness.

Also, to elaborate a bit further, we could see the idea of fear as that form where we encounter others, while anxiety is the condition that individualizes me from the-they. However, the most authentic condition of Dasein is in silence or reticence. On the other side, the qualities of inauthenticity are to be found in idle talk, ambiguity, and curiosity where we engage in our everydayness. It is through these three concepts that Dasein becomes an illusion and metaphysical. In Heidegger’s view there is no meaning in metalanguage/metaphysics—that leads nowhere. Being is Being-in-the-world. According to Heidegger, we have to give up any metaphysical explanation—we cannot ask for an explanation of all natural phenomenon. The reality is that things are on the open space and surface of things as things, so judgment is not the answer to find the truth. What is to be as true here, is when we let things be seen as they are and by themselves. Therefore, “idle talk” is not the reality of things as they are; but rather, just a cover up only; what is true and valid though, is discourse and disclosure because they constitute the world as the human world. Thus, the Heideggerian stance of the world is not to be interpreted as a proposition.

The basic Heideggerian premises and claim is that Dasein is ahead of itself in a potentiality and thrown towards the world. It is thrown in a location and that is an inauthentic condition which is its everydayness. But also, Dasein is “care” and that means “temporality” and thus “finitude”. Therefore, the being of Dasein is finitude. The reality of being-in-the-world is “care”, i.e. the reality of things is conditioned by the transcendence of Dasein. This is not a Kantian outlook, because Kant’s phenomenon of the world is a split one (Understanding and Imagination) like and inner and outer world.
For Heidegger on the other hand, there is no split, there is a Unity of Things in the world, i.e. the reality and Dasein is One condition. The Heideggerian concept of reality is better understood in The Origin of the Work of Art, where the artist and the work constitute one another as one sensational form or thing. Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant could be seen as for example, Kant refuses to comprehend the exteriority of the world, and thus that leaves Kant to support his thoughts through the inner condition if it

In regards to the aspect of “truth”, it seems that for Heidegger, “Being-true” (“truth”) means Being-uncovering*”. (262) That means, that truth or the essence of it is “freedom”. There seems to be a blurry condition of truth for Heidegger here, and we could state that 1) Dasein is in the true condition as unceasealment, 2) Dasein is in the untrue condition as concealment. Where does it reside? The answer seems to be founded in the condition that Dasein is both, it dwells in both conditions, and it has two parts that become one unity. What is important, at least for me, is that if Dasein is certain of death, then the truth of Dasein is death too. This is the biggest and greatest and the most unresolved “Enigma” of Dasein. Is there any sure answer to life and what being-there really means? What is the purpose of being-in-the-world?

As I stated a bit earlier, Dasein is care and that is temporality and that means death, i.e. death is mine and that is my only authentic moment and my individual freedom. This is the true condition of Dasein. What does it mean in Heideggerian terms, to say that death is mine? First of all, death is not relational. My death is not shared with the others. In this regard, Heidegger says: “Death is an undeniable ‘fact of experience’…The full existential-ontological conception of death may now be defined as follows: death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility—non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein’s end, in the Being of this entity towards its end.” (302-3) Heidegger is very explicit in regards to death and human existence, where finitude is inescapable from human reality. But the finitude of “the-they” is not my finitude and as such, death is what “the-they” flee or are not willing to face. Or another way to put it, however, it is that death does not happen to me for as long as death happens to “them”.

For Heidegger Dasein is disclosure and disclosure is being-towards-death projecting that which is “not-yet” of Dasein’s ownmost possibility—Dasein is the activity of nothing, of the not-yet seen-happened. According to Heidegger, death is to be grasped as an “anticipation” of possibilities and comprehending one’s very potentiality of being authentic. For Heidegger, “Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility.” (307) Anticipation opens up the very condition of possibilities of Dasein shattering itself and understanding freedom, i.e. freedom towards death. It is in paragraph 53 that
Heidegger talks about it. Also, as I alluded earlier, anxiety is an essential factor to understand Dasein’s rush towards death—it is the state of mind as the axiom of Dasein’s freedom towards death. For him this is a freedom discharged from the very false appearance of “the-they” swimming in the reality of the anxious mode of existence. In other words, Freedom can only be Freedom as the open possibility towards-finitude. The power of anticipation is that it shatters—it shatters my existence in the world. That is true, because death is in any case mine and no one can take it from me—Heidegger’s insistence is that death is non-relational, i.e. my death is a primary event and others’ death is secondary. Heidegger says: “...Dasein’s “Being-at-an-end” implies Being-towards-the-end. As Being-towards-the-end which understands—that is to say, as anticipation of death—resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be...It harbours in itself authentic Being-towards-death, as the possible existentiell modality of its own authenticity.” (353) A bit further, Heidegger asserts: “In its death, Dasein must simply ‘take back’ everything. Since resoluteness is constantly certain of death—in other words, since it anticipates it—resoluteness thus attains a certainty which is authentic and whole.” (356) A main target of Heidegger’s position is that, it is precisely the notion of anticipatory resoluteness where Dasein grasps itself; and also, it avails itself in the disappearance and in the indecisive condition of the they. The idea is that anticipation transports Dasein in a face-to-face situation of contingency, which is always present, but it also continuous to be dubious so as to comprehend the possibility of unattainability. The resoluteness of Dasein is in an “authentic” condition when it manages to be an anticipatory resoluteness, i.e. authentic resoluteness is the repetition of itself—of finitude.

Reiterating it again, I would like to reemphasize this key point: resoluteness is always moving towards finitude, i.e. resoluteness is death and where authenticity is constituted as such—this is the existential-phenomenon channeled through Anticipation, and Resolution in relationship with Dasein maintaining the idea of the whole. Then, Dasein is certain of death, and this implies that resoluteness ought to be sure of finitude as well. The importance here is that, it is precisely the aspect of repetition of death as that which reveals the anticipatory fashion. It is the circular mode of repetition the key factor for Dasein’s counter-thrust in to the world, precisely because death has an overwhelming power over Dasein.

What does it mean facing death? What is at stake here, is the facticity of Being-towards-death, which in itself conveys or announces a sort of isolation/aloofness, where the individual escapes the milieu he finds himself to be—“in”—his worldly environment of the They. This automatically unravels the fact that the given individual is involved into resoluteness—as Heidegger says, “into the resoluteness of “taking action...Along with
the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility.” (358) This is the authentic mode of existence where, one’s anxiety is aware of his potentiality for existence in the waters and horizons of everydayness, and where one picks up his individuality as it springs from a “sober joy”. This is a rapture, and this is a mood and a moment where Dasein transgresses or goes out violently from “The-They”, from its daily condition and routine, from its being-no-one or nobody in particular and recapturing itself as an authentic-possibility-being-towards-freedom, thus finitude. That is my finitude and this is that which individualizes me in my ownmost authentic condition of being. This is the unity of myself transgressing and going out from Falling—Falling understood as that which is everyday being in the world. The point is that, I take an action and this action emerges within my everydayness, which is to say, in a locality/community/collectivity—it is my inner rapture that enables me to direct/move away towards-my freedom. The Heideggerian reality is that, in the-They, I am another and I become them, for as long as I am in an inauthentic mode of being. Although, I am a self-existential performative unity and I act as a Unity (no god or soul or spirit is evolved/involved here), because myself is precisely that which, we can call it a repetition of an Act, i.e. the self-performance of my authentic resoluteness as finitude. What is the rest of my time when I am with-the-they mode of everydayness? From a Heideggerian perspective, the rest of the time that I spend being-with-alongside-them into the world of the-They is “inauthentic”. In other words, the resoluteness of Dasein is freedom and that is authenticity. The question than is, it is this mode of being temporal?

Dasein is ecstatic. Dasein is not a subject or an object either; but rather, it is in the things themselves, and alongside conditions into the world of things as things. The condition of Dasein is temporality and that leads us to say, finitude. Dasein has a history, and also, Dasein is historical and that is so, because Dasein encounters events in-the-world. From a Heideggerian point of view, history is not the past, but rather, is the [eruption] of a new beginning, of a new birth such as it can be the reality of a revolution—this is the rare power of the new-birth which has the character of an event. But also, history emerges from the repetition of the future looking at the past and evolving in the present. However, history is not static, and if that happens, then this static historicity is “inauthentic”. For history to be able to participate, it ought to be evolved in the mode of re-occurrence of the possible—authentic historicity is in the past. For Heidegger: “The possibility and the structure of historiological truth are to be expounded in terms of the authentic disclosedness (‘truth’) of historical existence.” (449) In other words, Heidegger’s position is that, “authentic historicity” is when the
future events (‘not-yet’) go back to the past, and that makes the preset historical condition Authentic just by repeating the past. To me, this is the greatest enigmatic-existence of Dasein’s existential-phenomenon.

It seems to me that the condition of Dasein is a “tragic” or a “heroic” condition in the world, and that pervades all Being and Time. I will not tackle the political implications of German nation, because that has already been a pressing issue for Schilling or Fichte, nor will I scrutinize Heidegger’s Nazi intellectual position and believes; although, he embodied them for a period of a short time. I will stop here in regards to political-Heidegger and I will end my inquiry with the philosopher-Heidegger. To me, it would be sad and unprofessional if one judges Heidegger’s philosophy from his political traumas, dramas, and melodramas. We better accept the fact that he was a full Nazi party-member for a few years; rather then, just saying that he was a half-Nazi or an illusionary-Nazi or a mistaken-Nazi, and etc. Heidegger’s situation was a pure political-opportunistic moment, believing that he could rightly change the world (might be the German world?), but he never, ever approved of and he absolutely never participated in that macabre propagandistic machine and those bloodthirsty persecutions that took place—he was never a part of it in any sense! That is all. We all have our political believes/weakness and we all make mistakes in our geo-existential-worldly-human condition—this is the struggle of Dasein as well.

Finally, for Heidegger, Dasein is an ecstatic-temporality looking towards finitude and thus emerging as an authentic condition thus as futural. Heidegger claims: “As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as “having been.” (373) He brings forth the concept of rapture, and that rapture in this case means that I am “time” as myself is reemerging from having been the past. This is the mode of my ownmost authentic being, where my future is my-having-been my past as it comes from the future. That is so because Dasein is temporality and temporality is finitude. It is the future that faces me and looks at me as if it is coming towards my condition, i.e. the condition that springs forth from my inauthentic everydayness, and it is here where time emerges, as that which I grasp my-being-there temporarily—the idea and the facticity of Dasein is that ecstatic-temporality where finitude emerges from the very inauthentic condition; and the situation of comprehending time is engaged in the “future-past-present” structure of ecstatic-temporality as a mode [swirl].

The temporalization of Dasein is finitude. For Heidegger “time” is “nows” and is not time as an infinite Platonic-Hegelian concept, and that is as we early said; Dasein is temporality comprehending finitude. The concept of “time” is that it is in between; with no beginning and end. The “now” for Heidegger is when temporality temporalizes the
now-time in the condition of inauthentic sequences or instances. He emphasizes the fact that: “Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care.” (374) The notion of care has been important for Dasein’s being-in the world, and that is precisely because in Heidegger’s terms, ‘care’ is Being-towards-death. Dasein is finitude. The significance of “care” for Dasein is propelled especially in paragraph 42 of Being and Time, where Heidegger articulates the idea that, Being-in-the-world has the imprint of care. And also, my own alteration where I can be free as being-in-the-world in my utmost action, is perceived as projection, which in itself is formed and realized just because, care determines my being and also Dasein as such. Care is temporality and that is finitude.

So far I have engaged with Heidegger’s hermeneutic philosophy and especially with Dasein, being-there-in-the-world. I have also mentioned earlier that, my stance is a Heideggerian one, comparing it or facing it with few other positions. Heidegger fundamentally and theoretically rejects any metaphysical notion of being in the world. His philosophical position is not compatible with that of Husserl, Sartre, Levinas, Tugendhat, and also not with Jaspers’ or y Gasset’s either. In my opinion, there is some good affinity/closeness with the late work of Merleau-Ponty, and specially his book The Visible and the Invisible; although, I have lied bare their differences. The main reason is that, according to Heidegger’s project, all the above still inherent more or less some devices of metaphysical past, and that is precisely the difference—Heidegger’s Being and Time, is the stage where the metaphysical past either directly or indirectly is repudiated, be it Platonic, Cartesian, Mystic, Transcendental/Idealistic or Hegelian-Marxian. I have made clear my Heideggerian opposition in regards to Sartre’s dialectical existentialism, Husserl’s’ eidetic abstraction as absolute subjectivism, Levinas’ metaphysical theism of the other, and Tugendhat’s analytic semantic-linguistic position—I do believe that, there is still some good ground and connection with Merleau-Ponty’s latest work, because as I have mentioned it earlier, it creates a unity of being in the world as One, abolishing positivity, relativity, or analytic thinking. That brought him closer to Heidegger’s unity; although, Merleau-Ponty did not understand being in the world, as that which is a ‘thrown projection’ in the world, but rather, I find myself in-to-the-world that which is ‘already there’, i.e. in between. The phenomenological understanding of late Merleau-Ponty is Heideggerian in structure, even though he bounces off a lot with Husserl. Although Heidegger never accepted the term existential or phenomenological philosopher in regards to his own philosophy, there still are some deep layers of the above.

More closely, the reason that I introduced Jaspers from the beginning of my inquiry is that he was an important thinker that elaborated in depth the notion of being in “between beginnings and the ends”. This notion of in-between is similar to that of
Kafka or Merleau-Ponty. Jasper struggled with this issue. This is a very existential moment. However, in Jasper one sees that there is no anticipation and resolution of the end as end, but he continuously wonders around about that moment of in-between, and in the mode of orientation as communication of my existence only—Heidegger’s moment is that, the end is my end and that is my finitude which sparks from my rapture and violent struggle with the them-they. The same thing applies with respect to y Gasset, where he talks about the manner we have to act in it (the human world) and to concern oneself with it (the world). y Gasset’s ‘concern’ is not the same as Heidegger’s ‘concern’, because Heidegger’s concern is temporality and that is Dasein’s death. In both scenarios, we are dealing with pure existential concepts, which one can very well find in Heidegger; however, the major difference is that, still y Gasset and Jasper operate in an existential dialectical mode, and there is no ontological unity of Being—no whole as one will find it in Heidegger. Heidegger’s Being and Time is unique, (whether one agrees with it or not) precisely because, for the first time we have the row understanding of what being in the world is/means: that is finitude where Dasein’s death does not rely on any spirit, or soul or god or infinity or class struggle, etc. Heidegger’s hermeneutic position is an earthly-existential-centripetal-world. It is all human as one self-unity. Dasein’s unity understands and presupposes the worldhood of the world because Dasein is the world. Dasein is care—Dasein is finitude and as Fernando Pessoa says; “and the knowledge that we die”.